The Language of Administrative Law by Daly, Paul
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646706 
1 
 
The Language of Administrative Law 
Paul Daly, University of Montreal 
DRAFT: For Canadian Bar Association conference « Hommage à Louis LeBel », 
October 29, 2015 
COMMENTS WELCOME: paul.daly@umontreal.ca 
One writer has mischievously suggested that appellate law is a “language game” played 
by lawyers and judges.1 Judicial review of administrative action, which proceeds by way 
of pleadings based on a settled, silent record, is a form of appellate law. And it has a 
strong claim to be considered a “language game”. For in administrative law, lawyers 
strive to portray decisions as “unreasonable” or “unfair”, terms they explain by invoking 
the various devices I discuss in this paper: developing mission statements, labelling 
categories of decision, perfecting terminological exactitude, evoking spectrums of 
procedural protection and inventing hypothetical reasonable persons. From time to time, 
scholars have even relied on metaphor to explain the grand sweeps of administrative law: 
from a long “sleep”,2 to “twilight”,3 to “reformation”,4 to doctrinal ebbs and flows.5 
In one way, this may simply be evidence of administrative law’s existential “crisis”,6 
provoked by “a dramatic and indeed radical change in the scope of judicial review”.7 To 
appreciate the fascination of administrative lawyers with language, some background is 
necessary. Judicial review of administrative action began to emerge as a distinct branch 
of the law only in the mid-20th century.  Administrative law, as it is typically called, has 
since blossomed as a result of judicial creativity. In the early-20th century, administrative 
action could be reviewed only in a narrow set of cases, where officials exercising 
statutory authority had determined, by a judicial process, the rights of an individual.8 Yet 
by the 1980s, it was safe to say that any governmental decision affecting the rights, 
interests, property, privileges, or liberties of any person was reviewable by the courts to 
ensure the legality and rationality of the decision and the fairness of the decision-making 
process.9  
                                                          
1 A.W.B. Simpson, Reflections on the Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), at p. 100. 
2 Robert Stevens, The English Judges (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), at p. 19. 
3 H.R.W. Wade (1951), 67 LQR 103.  
4 Richard Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law” (1975), 88 Harvard Law Review 
1669; Thomas Poole, “The Reformation of English Administrative Law” (2009), 68 Cambridge Law 
Journal 142 
5 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “The ‘Ebb’ and ‘Flow’ of Administrative Law on the ‘General Question of 
Law’”, in Michael Taggart ed., The Province of Administrative Law Determined (Hart, Oxford, 1997), p. 
308.  
6 Martin Loughlin, “Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law Theory” (1978), 28 
University of Toronto Law Journal 215. 
7 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374, at p. 414, per Lord Roskill.  
8 R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co., [1924] 1 KB 171, at 
pp. 204-205, per Atkin L.J.; R. v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, ex parte Haynes-Smith, 
[1928] 1 KB 411, at p. 415, per Hewart C.J. 
9 Lord Woolf of Barnes, “Droit Public – English Style”, [1995] Public Law 57 
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Since then, doctrine has developed still further. For example, factual findings of officials 
may be reviewed;10 officials can be bound to promises made by them to individuals;11 
and in many situations, individuals are entitled to reasons for adverse decisions.12 Such 
intrusive judicial review of official decision-making would have been unthinkable several 
decades ago.13 Administrative law’s scope and depth have increased: these increasingly 
intrusive grounds of review are available against a wide variety of public and private 
actors performing governmental functions. Now, the tentacles of administrative law 
embrace not only officials acting under express statutory authorization but, sometimes, 
private bodies performing public functions.14 However, although there has been vibrant 
scholarly debate about the legitimacy of developing judicially imposed controls on 
official action,15 the origins and raison d’être of the administrative law revolution are 
obscure.  
Three decades ago, Lord Diplock explained: “[T]he English law relating to judicial 
control of administrative action has been developed upon a case to case basis which has 
virtually transformed it over the last three decades”.16 Another 30 years on, 
administrative lawyers continue to struggle to account for the transformation in 
principled terms.17 Falling back on language may be a coping mechanism for judges, 
lawyers and academics deprived of clear principles around which their work can be 
organized.  
In general, language plays a useful descriptive role in administrative law, setting out a 
landscape that can be comfortably viewed and usefully discussed from 20,000 feet. 
However, overreliance on mission statements, labels, terminological exactitude, metaphor 
and personification obfuscates the inevitably normative task judges have in judicial 
review cases: deciding and explaining whether intervention would be justifiable or not. 
As Cooke P. (as he then was) explained in Thames Valley Electric Power Board v. NZFP 
Pulp & Paper Limited: 
[N]ever has it been suggested that the mere personal opinion of a Judge that a 
decision is unfair will justify holding it invalid. Nor is that ever likely to be 
suggested. The functions of exercising administrative discretion and judicially 
reviewing its exercise are fundamentally different. The line is not always easy to 
draw, but it has to be drawn.18 
                                                          
10 E. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] Q.B. 1044. 
11 R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan, [2001] Q.B. 213. 
12 Baker v.  Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 
13 Thomas Poole, “The Reformation of English Administrative Law” (2009), 68 Cambridge Law Journal 
142. 
14 Dawn Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Butterworths, London, 1999). 
15 See generally Christopher Forsyth ed., Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart, Oxford, 2000). 
16 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374, at p. 407.  
17 See e.g. Jack Williams, “Clarity and Ambiguity: A New Approach to the Test of Legitimacy in the Law 
of Legitimate Expectations” (2010), 30 Legal Studies 633. 
18 [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 641, at p. 653. 
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My goal here is to demonstrate the limits of language in administrative law, with a view 
to understanding the role of judicial review more clearly. Exposing the limits of the 
administrative law language game is not a frivolous endeavour:  
A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all 
the more completely because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is 
happening to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because our 
thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to 
have foolish thoughts.19 
My argument is not that administrative law doctrine can be made so clear as to become 
self-applying. Regardless of the rules or standards adopted judicial judgement will be 
necessary in applying them to individual cases. The point, rather, is that jurists who 
appreciate the limits of language in administrative law will think more clearly about 
doctrine and reach more accurate decisions.  As one wise judge admonished: “care needs 
to be taken to distinguish analytical tools from conclusions which encapsulate value 
judgments but do not give any indication of the route to those conclusions”.20  
In setting out my argument, I refer in particular to three sets of reasons written or co-
written by Justice Louis LeBel during his tenure on the Supreme Court of Canada in my 
analysis of the limits of language in contemporary administrative law. His careful 
concurring reasons in Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79,21 laid bare many of the 
problems with Canadian administrative law by exposing the shallowness of judicial resort 
to terminological exactitude to explain substantive review cases, a problem to which he 
returned in his seminal joint majority reasons (with Justice Bastarache) in Dunsmuir v. 
New Brunswick,22 which set out the Canadian framework for substantive judicial review. 
Yet his opinion for the Court in Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the 
Environment)23 bears testament to his belief in the power of the metaphor of a spectrum 
of governmental functions to elucidate the principles of procedural fairness.  
I. Mission Statements 
Perhaps the most attractive – though also the most facile – endeavour for those who think 
deeply about administrative law is to formulate a general principle that unifies disparate 
strands of case-law. This then functions as a mission statement, an administrative law 
                                                          
19 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language”.  
20 R. (Bibi) v. London Borough of Newham, [2001] EWCA Civ. 607, at para. 18.  
21  [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63. Hereafter “CUPE (2003)”. I call it CUPE (2003) to distinguish it 
from C.U.P.E. v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, which is generally referred to 
as “CUPE”. I must confess that I do not understand why one is supposed to refer to this foundational 
decision on deference as CUPE and not as New Brunswick Liquor. When a large institutional litigant is 
involved, it makes much more sense to employ the name of the smaller party as shorthand. Although I 
cannot claim to have researched the point minutely, it seems to me to be safe to say that the New 
Brunswick Liquor Corporation has not featured as often as the Canadian Union of Public Employees in 
important administrative law cases.  
22 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. 
23 [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, 2003 SCC 58. 
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raison d’être supposedly capable of guiding judges in the resolution of judicial review 
cases.24 In reality, though mission statements may provide a high-level overview of the 
task of judicial review, they provide little in the way of concrete guidance. Although they 
are “sometimes applied as if they were labels, somehow determining the outcome of a 
particular matter”, rather, “they have to be seen for what they are, in their particular 
context”.25 
A particularly popular mission statement involves “abuse of power”; 26 that through 
judicial review judges seek to prevent public officers from abusing their powers. 
Unfortunately, the abuse of power mission statement “goes no distance to tell you, case 
by case, what is lawful and what is not”. Rather, “[l]egal principle lies between the 
overarching rubric of abuse of power and the concrete imperatives of a rule-book”.27 
Much the same response can be given to the so-called “ultra vires” doctrine, which 
encapsulates the idea that in judicial review of administrative action courts do no more 
than enforce the formal boundaries established by legislation, but which has been 
exploded by the growing acceptance that judges have long looked to sources other than 
duly enacted laws to impose limits on executive action.28  
Lord Diplock’s tripartite classification of judicial review is another popular mission 
statement for administrative lawyers. In the GCHQ case, he suggested that “one can 
conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is 
subject to control by judicial review”: illegality, irrationality and procedural 
impropriety.29 One finds echoes of this mission statement in a recent Canadian case: 
“Judicial review is directed at the legality, reasonableness, and fairness of the procedures 
employed and actions taken by government decision makers”.30 
                                                          
24 Though his comments relate to mission statements adopted by administrative decision-makers, Keane 
C.J.’s observations in Keogh v. Criminal Assets Bureau, [2004] 2 I.R. 159, at p. 175 are worth quoting at 
length: 
It is undoubtedly the case that documents such as the [Taxpayer’s] Charter of Rights under 
consideration in the present case, whether so described or called a ‘mission statement’ or given 
some other title, frequently contain what are no more than praiseworthy statements of an 
aspirational nature designed to encourage the members of the organisation concerned to meet 
acceptable standards of behaviour in their dealings with the public and to give the latter some form 
of assurance that complaints as to discourtesy or other shortcomings on the part of the former will 
be seriously entertained. 
25 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995), 128 A.L.R. 353, per Toohey J. 
26 See e.g. In re Preston, [1985] 1 A.C. 835, at p. 851 (Lord Scarman), p. 864 (Lord Templeman); R. v. 
North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan, [2001] Q.B. 213, at para. 71; R. v. Department 
of Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1115, at p. xxx. For an early usage see Sir 
Alfred Denning, Freedom under the Law (London, Stevens & Sons, 1949), pp. 99-126. 
27 R. (Nadarajah) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] EWCA Civ. 1363, at para. 67. 
28 See e.g.  Sir John Laws, “Law and Democracy”, [1995] Public Law 72. For debate on whether it is 
necessary to reconcile judicial creativity with the sovereignty of parliament and, if so, how to reconcile the 
two, see Christopher Forsyth ed., Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart, Oxford, 2000).  
29 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374, at p. 410.  
30 See similarly Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, at para. 24. 
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But terms such as “legality”, “rationality”/“reasonableness” and “procedural 
impropriety”/“fairness” are not much more helpful than “abuse of power” in 
understanding the limits judges may place on administrative action: “though the general 
standards of legality, rationality, and procedural fairness may be firmly based in common 
law doctrine, their application to the facts of any particular case – and hence their 
concrete meaning – is largely dependent on the specific context under review”.31 What is 
important is to be able to translate abstract, high-level mission statements into “hard clear 
law”.32 Precisely what is required by way of doctrinal precision is a controversial 
question,33 but at the very least the mission statement must be parsed into usable 
doctrinal tools. For instance, legality breaks down into various sub-requirements: 
decision-makers must interpret the law appropriately;34 they must take into account 
relevant factors; they must use powers for proper purposes; and so on.35 No doubt 
judicial judgement will be required at some point in determining, for instance, what is 
relevant or proper, but this is very different from enforcing free-standing norms of 
legality, reasonableness and fairness. 
Of critical importance to the task of refining mission statements and deciding concrete 
cases is an understanding of the underlying principles of judicial review. It is thus 
significant that, in Dunsmuir, Justice LeBel, writing with Justice Bastarache, began not 
with a mission statement but with a recognition that Canadian judicial review doctrine is 
born of an “underlying tension” between two competing principles: “Courts, while 
exercising their constitutional functions of judicial review, must be sensitive not only to 
the need to uphold the rule of law, but also to the necessity of avoiding undue 
interference with the discharge of administrative functions in respect of the matters 
delegated to administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures”.36 These principles 
have much greater capacity to shape administrative law doctrine and influence judicial 
review practice than have abstract references to legality and rationality.37 Of course, these 
principles too must be implemented by more precise doctrinal rules, for “unless we 
commit to that sort of mapping project the law will continue to be rather chaotic, 
                                                          
31 T.R.S. Allan, “Doctrine and Theory in Administrative Law: An Elusive Quest for the Limits of 
Jurisdiction”, [2003] Public Law 429, at p. 431. 
32 R. v. Department of Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1115, at p. xxx, per 
Laws L.J.  
33 See e.g. Mark Elliott, “From Bifurcation to Calibration: Twin-Track Deference and the Culture of 
Justification” in Hanna Wilberg and Mark Elliott eds., The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: 
Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2015), at p. 61.  
34 I say “appropriately” rather than “correctly” because in some jurisdictions the boundaries of error of law 
are supplied by reasonableness rather than the terms of the statute as interpreted by a court.  
35 Rationality and reasonableness too require further analysis, as I explain in Part III of this paper. Fairness 
also has sub-requirements relating to the conduct of a hearing; rules of impartiality; and guarantees of 
independence, to be discussed in Part IV. 
36 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47. 
37 See generally, Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian 
Administrative Law” (2012), 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 317.  
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unprincipled, and result-orientated”;38 if first-order normative principles are given 
“immediate normative operation”, judges risk distributing palm-tree justice.39 Without 
more, legality, rationality and fairness give little guidance to jurists tasked with shaping 
and applying administrative law.  
In short, mission statements serve the limited purpose of providing a high-level overview 
of the function of judicial review of administrative action in a given legal system, but 
they provide limited detail on its operation in practice. For that, one must take a much 
closer look.  
II. Always Read the Label Carefully 
Sometimes, in order to take the necessary much closer look, it is necessary to carefully 
peel off the labels applied to particular ‘forms’ of administrative decision-making. These 
labels are conclusory, functioning as a rough description of the reasons in favour of or 
against judicial intervention but obscuring the true nature of the underlying concept. 
For instance, it sometimes still matters in Canadian law whether a power is exercised 
quasi-judicially.40 A four-part test applies: 
(1) Is there anything in the language in which the function is conferred or in the 
general context in which it is exercised which suggests that a hearing is 
contemplated before a decision is reached? 
(2) Does the decision or order directly or indirectly affect the rights and 
obligations of persons? 
(3) Is the adversary process involved? 
(4) Is there an obligation to apply substantive rules to many individual cases 
rather than, for example, the obligation to implement social and economic policy 
in a broad sense?41 
But the test is hopelessly circular. It is merely a description of processes that historically 
have been considered “quasi-judicial”. It does nothing to say whether a particular, more 
rigorous, process should be followed in an individual case. An Irish author offers an 
uncannily similar verdict on a the test for identifying “judicial” functions in his 
jurisdiction: “this definition provided only a descriptive summary…[and]…did not offer 
                                                          
38 Michael Taggart, “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury” [2008] N.Z.L.R. 423, 453. See similarly 
Yves-Marie Morissette, « Rétrospective et Prospective sur le Contentieux Administratif » (2008-2009) 39 
Revue de droit de l’Université de Sherbrooke 1, at p. 42, expressing his fear of « une floraison chaotique de 
normes contradictoires ». 
39 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, ex parte Lam (2003), 195 A.L.R. 502, at p. 519, per 
Gummow J.  
40 For example, in determining the scope of operation of Ontario’s Statutory Powers Procedure Act, or 
Quebec’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which in s. 23 guarantees administrative independence. 
41 Minister of National Revenue v. Coopers and Lybrand, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 495, at p. 504. 
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a suitably prescriptive analysis of the core concepts of the judicial function…[I]t owes 
more to historical happenstance than conceptual coherence”.42 
Another example is provided by “legislative” decisions to which no duty of procedural 
fairness applies.43 The label, however, is not self-applying. As Estey J. tellingly put it, 
refusing to apply procedural safeguards to a “legislative” decision in Attorney General of 
Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat, “[i]t is always a question of construing the statutory scheme as 
a whole in order to see to what degree, if any, the legislator intended the principle [of 
procedural fairness] to apply”.44 There, consumers involved in a telecommunications 
rate-setting process appealed the decision to the federal cabinet. Cabinet affirmed the 
decision, but accorded no participatory rights to the consumers. Although Estey J. 
described the rate-setting decision as “legislative action in its purest form”,45 closer 
analysis reveals that the “legislative” label obscures the normative heavy lifting 
performed by a careful contextual analysis. This was a unique procedure where “the 
executive branch has been assigned a function performable in the past by the Legislature 
itself”.46 Because of the lack of “practicality” of hearing all parties,47 the absence of 
“standards or guidelines in the exercise of its rate review function” were set out in 
legislation48 and the fact that the members of cabinet were asked “to respond to the 
political, economic and social concerns of the moment”49, according procedural rights 
would have been inappropriate.50 One can argue about the wisdom of Estey J.’s 
conclusion, but once the “legislative” label is removed, it is clear that the case turned on 
the normative considerations canvassed in his contextual analysis.  
The same can be said of another category of decision that is excluded from procedural 
fairness protections, that of “commercial” decisions. The leading Canadian case is Irving 
Shipbuilding Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).51 Here, sub-contractors to an 
unsuccessful bidder on a government contract sought to impugn the fairness of the 
procedures employed. Evans J.A. observed that the context was “essentially commercial” 
and that “it will normally be inappropriate to import into a predominantly commercial 
relationship, governed by contract, a public law duty developed in the context of the 
                                                          
42 Eoin Carolan, “Separation of Powers and Administrative Governance” in Eoin Carolan and Oran Doyle 
eds., The Irish Constitution: Governance and Values (Thomson Roundhall, Dublin, 2008), p. 195, at p. 
220. 
43 See e.g. Bates v. Lord Hailsham, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1019, at p. 1024. 
44 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, at p. 755. 
45 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, at p. 754. 
46 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, at p. 758. 
47 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, at p. 754. 
48 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, at p. 753. 
49 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, at p. 755 
50 As I have written: 
There is no neat box marked “legislative decisions”. Rather, “legislative” is a label applied after-
the-fact, to a conclusion reached on substantive grounds that a procedural fairness claim is 
inappropriate in a particular case. 
“The Policy/Operational Distinction – a View from Administrative Law” (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17, at p. 
27. 
51 [2010] 2 F.C.R. 488. 
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performance of governmental functions pursuant to powers derived solely from 
statute”.52 Addition of the qualifier “normally” indicates that the formal labelling of the 
decision as “commercial” was not determinative. Indeed, Evans J.A. mentioned six 
reasons why permitting the sub-contractor to raise a procedural fairness argument would 
be inappropriate. For instance, it would raise “the alarming possibility of a cascading 
array of potential procedural rights holders”53 and potentially compromise “the efficiency 
of the tendering process”.54 Moreover, Evans J.A. refused to rule out the possibility of 
judicial review to enforce procedural fairness at the instance of a sub-contractor “where 
the misconduct of government officials was so egregious that the public interest in 
maintaining the essential integrity of the procurement process was engaged”.55 Running 
through this close contextual analysis is an appreciation of the normative underpinnings 
of judicial review: a concern to protect the rule of law while also safeguarding the 
efficiency of public administration.56  
Labels invite formalistic thinking which in turn invites confusion: 
Formalism is formal in that it requires judges to operate with categories and 
distinctions that determine results without the judges having to deploy the substantive 
arguments that underpin the categories and distinctions. Since those categories and 
distinctions must take on a life of their own in order to operate in this detached way, 
they are capable of determining results that contradict the very arguments for these 
categories and distinctions.57 
Lawyers will more clearly understand administrative law if labels such as “quasi-
judicial”, “legislative” and “commercial” are removed to permit focus on the underlying 
normative considerations. 
III. A Hard Look at the Language of Rationality 
Language can be useful in reminding judges of the limits of the judicial role. As any 
student of administrative law comes quickly to understand, where a power has been 
assigned by legislation to an administrative body, it is not for a reviewing court to 
substitute its judgement on the merits of the decision taken. Administrative lawyers make 
a fundamental distinction between judicial review – which forms part of the inherent 
jurisdiction of superior courts of record but is limited to an assessment of legality – and 
appeals – which may only be created by statute and which may permit an appellate body 
to interfere on the merits.58 Where judicial review requires a consideration of the merits 
                                                          
52 Irving Shipbuilding, at para. 46. Emphasis added. 
53 Irving Shipbuilding, at para. 50.  
54 Irving Shipbuilding, at para. 52.  
55 Irving Shipbuilding, at para. 61. 
56 See further Mark Elliott, “Judicial Review’s Scope, Foundations and Purposes: Joining the Dots”, [2012] 
N.Z.L.R. 75. 
57 David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law” (2002), 
27 Queens L.J. 445, 450. 
58 See generally Paul Daly, « Les appels administratifs au Canada » (2015), 93 Revue du Barreau canadien 
1. 
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of an administrative decision, as in situations where the rationality of the decision is 
under attack, judges need to be careful to respect the autonomy of the decision-maker 
chosen by the legislature.  
Accordingly, the terminology of rationality review is designed to remind judges of their 
institutional role. Lord Greene M.R.’s formulation of Wednesbury unreasonableness is a 
classic example: “something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it 
lay within the powers of the authority”;59 courts could intervene only “if a decision on a 
competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to 
it…”, but this would require the applicant to demonstrate something “overwhelming”.60 
Other colourful formulations can be found in the cases. Lord Diplock described this 
ground of review as requiring “a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic 
or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the 
question to be decided could have arrived at it”.61 An Irish judge saw the judicial role as 
“considering whether the impugned decision plainly and unambiguously flies in the face 
of plain reason and common sense”.62 These formulations are salutary reminders of the 
appropriate limits of judicial oversight of the administration.   
Language has played a similar role over the course of recent Canadian administrative law 
history, since the emergence of the ‘patent unreasonableness’ standard of review of 
expert administrative decision-makers in the 1970s. As Justice LeBel observed in CUPE 
(2003), the definitions of ‘patent unreasonableness’ offered by the Supreme Court of 
Canada were “intended to indicate the high degree of deference inherent in this standard 
of review”.63 He offered as examples the definitions suggested by Justice Dickson – 
“cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation”64 – Justice Cory – a “very 
strict test…[satisfied when a decision is]…clearly irrational, that is to say evidently not in 
accordance with reason”65 – and Justice Iacobucci – a defect characterized by 
“immediacy or obviousness”66 leading to a decision “so flawed that no amount of curial 
deference can justify letting it stand”67.  
However, language has its limits. Justice LeBel’s reasons in CUPE (2003) represent a 
thoughtful engagement with the limits of language in substantive review. At the time, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s framework for substantive judicial review of administrative 
                                                          
59 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury, [1948] 1 K.B. 223, at p. 229.  
60 Wednesbury, at p. 230. 
61 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374, at p. 410. Strikingly, 
his Lordship also commented that to “eliminate confusion”, the term “reasonableness” is best avoided in 
public law. Ibid., at p. 409.  
62 State (Keegan) v. Stardust Victims’ Compensation Tribunal, [1986] I.R. 642, at p. 658.  
63 CUPE (2003), at para. 78. 
64 CUPE, at p. 237. 
65 Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941, at pp. 963-964. 
66 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at para. 57.  
67 Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, at para. 52. 
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action was under attack. Commentators decried the “epistemological” confusion68 created 
by an unwieldy four-factor analysis69 combined with three standards of review, a non-
deferential standard of correctness that permitted a reviewing court to substitute its view 
for that of the decision-maker and two deferential standards: reasonableness simpliciter 
and patent unreasonableness.  
In a memorable passage, one first-instance judge wrote: 
In attempting to follow the court’s distinctions between “patently unreasonable”, 
“reasonable” and “correct”, one feels at times as though one is watching a juggler 
juggle three transparent objects.  Depending on the way the light falls, sometimes 
one thinks one can see the objects.  Other times one cannot and, indeed, wonders 
whether there are really three distinct objects there at all.70 
Justice LeBel began by noting that the judiciary must ensure a “predictable, workable and 
coherent jurisprudence” for use by lawyers, litigants and lower courts,71 a duty they had 
failed in because the prevailing law “does not currently provide sufficiently clear 
parameters”.72 The limits of terminological exactitude could be most clearly observed in 
judicial attempts to distinguish reasonableness simpliciter from patent unreasonableness. 
As Justice LeBel explained, the two standards shared an underlying analytical basis – that 
there will be sometimes, perhaps often, be more than one possible reasonable 
interpretation of a statutory provision, in which case a reviewing court should defer to the 
wisdom of the front-line decision-maker: “Because patent unreasonableness and 
reasonableness simpliciter are both rooted in this guiding principle, it has been difficult to 
frame the standards as analytically, rather than merely semantically, distinct”.73  
Indeed, the gallant efforts to distinguish the indistinguishable came to resemble judicial 
linguistic gymnastics as judges fell over one another in their attempts to achieve a perfect 
verbal distillation of the two deferential standards of unreasonableness. Cory J.’s 
invocation of the adjective “clearly” added little more than “rhetorical effect”.74 LeBel J. 
also cited a first-instance judge who had commented: “If the unreasonableness of a 
decision is not clear or obvious, I do not see how that decision can be said to be 
                                                          
68 D. J. Mullan, “Recent Developments in Standard of Review”, in Canadian Bar Association (Ontario), 
Taking the Tribunal to Court:  A Practical Guide for Administrative Law Practitioners (2000), at p. 26. 
69 For the uninitiated: statutory language (the presence or absence of a privative clause and right of appeal); 
the nature of the question (legal or factual); the relative expertise of the decision-maker and the reviewing 
court; and the purpose of the provision at issue (policy-making choice or the application of an objective 
legal norm to the facts as found).  
70 Miller v. Workers’ Compensation Commission (Nfld.) (1997), 154 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 52 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.), 
at para. 27, per Barry J. (as he then was). I note that Barry J.A. (as he now is) remains interested in these 
issues: see the excellent discussion in Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission v. Allen, 
(2014), 379 DLR (4th) 271.  
71 CUPE (2003), at para. 64. 
72 CUPE (2003), at para. 66. 
73 CUPE (2003), at para. 103. 
74 D. J. Mullan, “Recent Developments in Standard of Review”, in Canadian Bar Association (Ontario), 
Taking the Tribunal to Court:  A Practical Guide for Administrative Law Practitioners (2000), at p. 24. 
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unreasonable”.75 As long as the judicial inquiry was to whether a decision was rationally 
supported by the reasoning and evidence offered by the decision-maker, a meaningful 
distinction “attempting to qualify degrees of irrationality”76 would be impossible: “There 
seems to me to be no qualitative basis on which to differentiate effectively between these 
various characterizations of a rationality analysis; how, for instance, would a decision 
that is not “tenably supported” (and is thus “merely” unreasonable) differ from a decision 
that is not “rationally supported” (and is thus patently unreasonable)?”77 The same was 
true of a “somewhat probing examination”78 of a decision, difficult to distinguish from 
one that is “simply probing, or…less than probing”;79 whether it was designed to identify 
an immediately obvious defect or one that is obvious once it has been discovered.80 And 
if a “merely” unreasonable decision should be allowed to stand because it was not 
“clearly” or “patently” unreasonable, or a defect overlooked because it required more 
than a somewhat probing examination to uncover it, the law would be according 
irrationality a “legitimate presence in the legal system”,81 a most unsavoury prospect.82 
In 2003, Justice LeBel saw “no easy way out of this conundrum”,83 but his preferred 
solution was relatively clear, as he signed off by asking “Should courts move to a two 
standard system of judicial review, correctness and a revised unified standard of 
reasonableness”.84 Sure enough, five years later, Justice LeBel and Justice Bastarache 
wrote the set of reasons in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick that abolished the two deferential 
standards and replaced them with one:  
Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies 
the development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain 
questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one 
specific, particular result.  Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, 
reasonable conclusions.  Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range 
of acceptable and rational solutions.  A court conducting a review for 
reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, 
referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes.  In 
judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of 
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process.  
                                                          
75 Hao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 184 F.T.R. 246, at para. 9, per Reed J. 
76 CUPE (2003), at para. 111.  
77 CUPE (2003), at para. 107. 
78 Southam, at para. 56. 
79 D. W. Elliott, “Suresh and the Common Borders of Administrative Law:  Time for the Tailor?” (2002), 
65 Sask. L. Rev. 469, at pp. 486-87, cited in CUPE (2003), at para. 112. 
80 CUPE (2003), at paras. 116-120.  
81 CUPE (2003), at para. 132. 
82 CUPE (2003), at paras. 109, 125.  
83 CUPE (2003), at para. 121. 
84 CUPE (2003), at para. 134.  
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But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, 
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.85 
But this definition too has difficulties. What exactly do “justification”, “transparency” 
and “intelligibility” mean? Just as it added little to “irrational” to add “clearly”, so it 
added little to “reasonableness” to add these abstract hallmarks of best administrative 
practice. Indeed, some courts took this aspirational language as a departure from the 
policy of deferential self-restraint and a signal to intervene more readily in the 
administrative process.86 The Court soon replaced its aspirational language with a more 
restrictive and more precise formulation.87 As Justice LeBel put it in a subsequent case, 
the question is whether the reviewing court can “clearly understand” the thought process 
of the decision-maker.88 Even here, language alone cannot do all the work – for to apply 
this test a reviewing court must appreciate the role of reasons and the record in permitting 
it to perform its task of ensuring that the decision under review was reasonable89 – but it 
sets out a comprehensible criterion for judicial judgement.   
Being misled by linguistic formulations is not a pitfall unique to the Canadian legal 
landscape. The United States has its ‘hard look’ test for determining whether an 
administrative decision was arbitrary or capricious. Does this mean that reviewing courts 
must literally take a hard look at the material in the record, reading it twice or three times, 
or perhaps with the aid of a magnifying glass? But shouldn’t they always take a hard 
look?90 Similar questions might be posed of England’s ‘anxious scrutiny’ standard: 
shouldn’t a judge’s scrutiny always be anxious? Is ‘anxious scrutiny’ to be juxtaposed 
against ‘relaxed scrutiny’, performed perhaps under the influence of barbiturates? In both 
cases the answer is no. Indeed, the ‘hard look’ and ‘anxious scrutiny’ labels are 
dangerously misleading. Arbitrary and capricious review is in fact similar to – perhaps 
indistinguishable from – the grounds of abuse of discretion well known to the common 
law;91 and anxious scrutiny imposes additional process obligations on decision-makers in 
                                                          
85 Dunsmuir, at para. 47. 
86See e.g. Driver Iron Inc. v. International Association of Bridge, Structural Ornamental and Reinforcing 
Ironworkers, Local Union No. 720 (2011), 502 A.R. 229, rev’d [2012] 3 S.C.R. 405;  Public Service 
Alliance of Canada v. Canada Post Corporation, [2011] 2 FCR 221, rev’d [2011] 3 S.C.R. 572. 
87 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), [2011] 3 
S.C.R. 708, at para. 14: “the reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of 
showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes”. 
88 Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 89.  
89 See e.g. Leahy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 227, [2014] 1 FCR 766, at para. 
122: “Any reviewing court upholding a decision whose bases cannot be discerned would blindly accept the 
decision, abdicating its responsibility to ensure that it is consistent with the rule of law”. See also Wall v. 
Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2014 ONCA 884. 
90 In practice the look might not be very hard at all. See Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, “Thin 
Rationality Review”, Unpublished, August 4, 2015 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2639644) 
91 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (1983) 463 U.S. 
29, at p. 43: 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of 
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
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sensitive cases.92 In neither case does the language of hardness or anxiety do any 
analytical work. 
The difficulty in all of these cases lies in using descriptive language as a substitute for 
doctrinal precision. As Lord Greene M.R. observed in Wednesbury, reasonableness “has 
frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that 
must not be done”.93 Yet what really matters is whether judicial intervention is 
justifiable. This is purely a normative question.94 Thinking that descriptive language can 
provide the necessary normative basis for judicial intervention (or, indeed, judicial 
restraint) is a serious error. A judge must demonstrate why there is a basis for 
intervention, something that requires engagement with the underlying “substantive 
principles”95 or “reason and structure”96 of unreasonableness or irrationality.97 
Otherwise, the reviewing court risks overstepping the limits of the judicial role by 
substituting judgement on the merits of the question at issue; at the very least, it “renders 
doctrinal analysis otiose”.98  
Sometimes the error of substituting descriptive terms for normative analysis is 
compounded by the introduction of a hypothetical reasonable observer. Consider these 
observations of an Irish judge: 
[T]he kind of error that produces invalidity is one which no rational or sane decision 
maker, no matter how misguided could essay to be reviewably irrational. It is not 
sufficient that a decision maker goes wrong or even hopelessly or fundamentally 
wrong: he must have gone completely and inexplicably mad: taken leave of his senses 
and come to an absurd conclusion. It is only when this last situation arises or 
something akin to it that a court will review the decision for irrationality.99 
Not only does this passage reveal the standard error of those who search in vain for 
terminological exactitude – what is the difference between the “wrong” and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise. 
92 Paul Craig, “Judicial Review and Anxious Scrutiny: Foundations, Evolution and Application”, [2015] PL 
60. 
93 Wednesbury, at p. 229.  
94 See e.g. Delios v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA 117, at para. 26: 
Bearing in mind the margin of appreciation that the administrator should be given – a margin that 
can be narrow, moderate or wide according to the circumstances – we examine the administrator’s 
decision in light of the evidentiary record and the law, to examine whether the decision is 
acceptable and defensible on the facts and the law. 
95 Anthony Lester and Jeffrey Jowell, “Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative 
Law”, [1987] Public Law 368 
96 Paul Daly, “Wednesbury’s Reason and Structure”, [2011] Public Law 237. 
97 See also Paul Craig, “The Nature of Reasonableness Review” (2013), Current Legal Problems 1, though 
for all that Craig is persuasive in demonstrating that reasonableness review requires consideration by 
judges of the weight given to relevant factors by decision-makers, he does not provide much guidance to 
judges charged with assessing reasonableness in a particular case.  
98 Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, 11th ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), p. 304, fn. 124. 
99 Aer Rianta v. Commissioner for Aviation Regulation, unreported, High Court, January 16, 2003 
(O’Sullivan J.). 
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“hopelessly or fundamentally wrong”? – but it also conjures up a mythical decision-
maker who has been afflicted by madness, as if the judge’s role were to imagine himself 
as a delirious official asked to take an administrative decision. But judicial review does 
not require such leaps of imagination. It requires only that judges ask whether a decision 
should stand or fall and apply appropriate criteria in answering this question.  
IV.  The Fabulous Baker Factors and the Spectrum of Procedural Fairness 
One very useful way to conceptualize the administrative state is to perceive it as a 
spectrum, along which, as Justice LeBel put it in Imperial Oil, the requirements of the 
law “may vary in order to reflect the context of a decision‑maker’s activities and the 
nature of its functions”:100  
The categories of administrative bodies involved range from administrative 
tribunals whose adjudicative functions are very similar to those of the courts, such 
as grievance arbitrators in labour law, to bodies that perform multiple tasks and 
whose adjudicative functions are merely one aspect of broad duties and powers 
that sometimes include regulation‑making power.  The notion of administrative 
decision‑maker also includes administrative managers such as ministers or 
officials who perform policy‑making discretionary functions within the apparatus 
of government.101 
This well-known idea of a “spectrum”102 can be roughly mapped as follows: Ministers103 
 Crown Corporations104 Social and Economic Regulation105  Quasi-Judicial106  
Judicial.107  
                                                          
100 Imperial Oil, at para. 31. 
101 Imperial Oil, at para. 31.  
102 Martineau v. Matsqui Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, at pp. 628-629 per Dickson J., 
dissenting: 
A purely ministerial decision, on broad grounds of public policy, will typically afford the 
individual no procedural protection, and any attack upon such a decision will have to be founded 
upon abuse of discretion.  Similarly, public bodies exercising legislative functions may not be 
amenable to judicial supervision.  On the other hand, a function that approaches the judicial end of 
the spectrum will entail substantial procedural safeguards.  Between the judicial decisions and 
those which are discretionary and policy-oriented will be found a myriad decision-making 
processes with a flexible gradation of procedural fairness through the administrative spectrum. 
See also Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 4 F.C.R. 264, at para. 104, per Evans J.A., 
referring to “the spectrum of powers ranging from the legislative, through the administrative, to the 
judicial”. 
103 I have in mind here government departments headed by a politician who is accountable to a legislature 
(and perhaps also, as a modern addition to the convention of responsible government, to the public at large) 
and whose name departmental officials may act.  
104 I have in mind here the various bodies established by the state to achieve commercial goals; these are 
relatively rarely subject to judicial review because their activities are primarily commercial in nature, but 
they are subject to governmental control.  
105 I have in mind here bodies charged with regulating complex aspects of society and the economy. Central 
banks, telecommunications regulators and competition regulators would fall under this rubric. 
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Viewing functions on this spectrum is a very useful, intuitive way of grasping many of 
the issues that arise in terms of political and legal control of the administration.108 On the 
purely political end of the spectrum lies ministerial decision-making, where political 
control through conventions of accountability to the legislature predominates. Here, 
procedural protections are diminished – indeed, in Imperial Oil, an argument that the 
minister was biased because his department would have won a budgetary windfall from 
penalizing an oil company failed for precisely this reason. In addition, the range of 
considerations that a minister might take into account in making a decision is often very 
broad indeed.109  
On the purely legal end of the spectrum lies judicial decision-making. By “judicial” in 
this context, I do not mean decision-making by courts of law. Rather, I am concerned 
with the application by administrative bodies of objective legal norms to the facts as 
found. The French term “juridictionnelle”, which does not have a ready English 
equivalent, captures the idea. Here, political interference is – or at least should be110 –
frowned upon, for the distribution of costs and benefits set out by the legislature should 
not be interfered with by executive fiat.111 Legal control is heightened, in the sense that 
the range of considerations that a judicial decision-maker may legitimately take into 
account is tightly constrained: if the question is whether an applicant has accumulated 
enough days of work to claim an entitlement, the decision-maker cannot rove into the 
applicant’s conduct or utility to society. Procedural protections are at their strongest here, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
106 I have in mind here administrative tribunals that the legislature has established to settle disputes, usually 
between an administrative body and an individual but sometimes (as with human rights tribunals) between 
two individuals. Often these tribunals complement the work of social and economic regulators: in some of 
its functions, for instance, a telecommunications regulator will act quasi-judicially but in others it will act 
as a developer of general rules of policy for its regulatory sector. 
107 I explain this term further below: the difference between a quasi-judicial and judicial function is simply 
one of degree, with a quasi-judicial decision-maker entitled to take into account a broader range of factors – 
such as the overall effect of a decision on achievement of its overall policy goals – than a judicial decision-
maker.  
108 For this distinction, see e.g. Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2005). 
109 See e.g. Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities) v. Jagjit Singh Farwaha, 2014 
FCA 56, at paras. 88-99. 
110 Ron Ellis, Unjust by Design: Canada’s Administrative Justice System (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2013) 
inveighs most effectively against political interference, largely unremarked by the wider public, with 
judicial tribunals.  
111 Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1988), p. 112: 
Imagine our outrage if, at the end of a court trial, the president of the United States called up the 
judge and told her how he wanted the case to come out. Let us suppose an agency has held a rule-
making proceeding that involved hundreds of hours of testimony and thousands of pages of written 
submissions. It has listened at length to every interested group and heard the rebuttal of each group 
to the testimony of every other. It has compiled a thousand-page-long rule-making record. It has 
then composed a statement showing that it has acted synoptically to consider every significant 
issue and arrive at the best possible decision. Those who have been watching and participating in 
such a process are going to be equally outraged if, just before the agency publishes its final rule, 
the president calls to tell the agency what rule it should adopt. 
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where the decision-making process – the application of objective legal norms112 to facts – 
closely resembles that of a court of law.  
In between the two extremes, the extent of political and legal control varies as one moves 
back and forth along the spectrum, more strongly legal towards the judicial end, more 
strongly political towards the ministerial end. In terms of giving a snapshot of the 
administrative state and providing a rough idea against which one’s intuitions about the 
appropriate level of political and legal control can be tested, this spectrum of functions is 
exceedingly useful.  
As useful as it is, however, the metaphor of the spectrum serves to distract courts from 
their role in ensuring procedural fairness in the administrative process. In procedural 
fairness, cases are often said to turn on an appreciation of all the relevant context: “Like 
the principles of natural justice, the concept of procedural fairness is eminently variable 
and its content is to be decided in the specific context of each case”.113 An administrative 
process “need not assume the trappings of a court”.114 Only “some kind of hearing”115 in 
which the conventional list of procedural protections – notice, making submissions, 
representation by counsel, cross-examination of witnesses and so on – need not be 
followed to the letter. Depending on the interplay of the five “Baker” factors,116 a 
particular decision can be placed on the spectrum somewhere between the two extremes 
in order to determine the appropriate procedural protections:  
Some administrative tribunals are closer to the executive end of the spectrum: 
their primary purpose is to develop, or supervise the implementation of, particular 
government policies.   Such tribunals may require little by way of procedural 
protections.  Other tribunals, however, are closer to the judicial end of the 
spectrum: their primary purpose is to adjudicate disputes through some form of 
                                                          
112 An intelligent student once objected to me that not all norms applied by courts of law can truly be 
described as objective, open-textured constitutional provisions being perhaps the best example. This is a 
complicated area (see e.g.  Matthew Kramer, Objectivity and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); R. v. Department of Education and Employment, ex parte Begbie, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 
1115, at p. xxx (“Fairness and reasonableness (and their contraries) are objective concepts; otherwise there 
would be no public law, or if there were it would be palm tree justice”). I nonetheless think the basic point 
about the application of law to facts withstands scrutiny.   
113 Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, at p. 682. 
114 Knight, at para. 49. 
115 Henry Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing” (1975), 123 University of Pennslyvania Law Review1267.  
116 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. This non-exhaustive 
list (ibid., at para. 28) was summarized more recently in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 SCC 30, 
[2011] 2 S.C.R. 504, at para. 42: 
(i) “the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it” (para. 23); (ii) 
“the nature of the statutory scheme and the ‘terms of the statute pursuant to which the body 
operates’” (para. 24); (iii) “the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected” 
(para. 25); (iv) “the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision” (para. 26); and 
(v) “the choices of procedure made by the agency itself, particularly when the statute leaves to the 
decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures, or when the agency has an expertise in 
determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances” (para. 27). 
The citations are to Baker.  
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hearing.  Tribunals at this end of the spectrum may possess court-like powers and 
procedures.117  
However, the use of “may” in this passage is telling. Placing a decision on a spectrum is 
not enough. Something more is required before a court can satisfy itself that the 
procedure at issue was fair or unfair. Indeed, the metaphor of the spectrum obscures more 
than it reveals. The Baker factors emphasize the importance of context and evoke a 
spectrum of administrative functions but they do not assist courts or decision-makers in 
determining whether a particular procedural right should be granted. In reality, very 
specific normative criteria attach to each of the procedural rights that an individual may 
claim in the administrative process. For example: minimum standards of fairness require 
that an individual “have full and complete notice of the charges against him and an 
opportunity to reply thereto”;118 an oral hearing will be required where it is necessary to 
determine an issue of credibility;119 evidence cannot be refused on a critical point;120 
representation by counsel is required only where the proceedings are so important and 
complex that an individual will be unable to make his or her case effectively;121 and 
cross-examination need only be permitted where it is necessary to ensure the decision-
maker has the “full story”.122 In this sense, the Baker factors are fabulous. Some judicial 
judgement will be required in determining the answers to the more specific questions 
relating to particular procedural rights, but judges are certainly not roving along a 
spectrum searching for a mirror image of the type of process presented by the case in 
hand. 
A risk of swallowing bromides about context and relying on the vague, abstract notion of 
a spectrum to ‘resolve’ concrete cases is that courts may create “a modern version of Sir 
William Wade's nightmare of a Tennysonian ‘wilderness of single instances’ in which all 
the contextual factors will be relevant in considering what the requirements of procedural 
fairness are in a given situation without any factor or group of factors having decisive 
weight in shaping what is in practice required”.123 However, jurists can avoid this danger 
by understanding that the question in procedural fairness cases is whether a particular 
right should have been accorded – not whether the procedure was in fact consistent with 
the decision-maker’s place on the spectrum of administrative procedures. Fairness is a 
normative matter, not a descriptive one. 
                                                          
117 Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Association, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884, 2003 SCC 36, at para. 
21. Emphasis added. See further Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin, “The Contextual Turn: Iacobucci's 
Legacy and the Standard of Review in Administrative Law” (2007), 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 
581. 
118 Confederation Broadcasting (Ottawa) Ltd. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission, [1971] S.C.R. 
906, at p. 925. 
119 Khan v. University of Ottawa (1997), 34 OR (3d) 535. 
120 Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières v. Larocque, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 471. 
121 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 86. 
122 Irvine v. Canada (Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 181, at para. 87. 
123 R. (L.) v. West London Mental Health NHS Trust, [2014] EWCA Civ. 47, at para. 72, per Beatson L.J. 
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The metaphor of the spectrum also causes problems in determining the appropriate 
degree of administrative independence from outside interference. Take, for instance, a 
central bank whose mandate is to set monetary policy. On the spectrum of procedural 
fairness, a central bank would fall more or less in the middle, along with 
telecommunications and competition regulators and similar bodies. Yet central bank 
independence from political interference is a cherished norm of most developed liberal 
democracies.124 For instance, even though the Bank of Canada is formally subject to the 
authority of the Minister of Finance, with whom its governor must meet regularly,125 
howls of outrage greet any perceived political interference with the establishment of 
monetary policy.126 Howls of outrage that, one might add, are often absent when 
politicians attempt to influence judicial decision-making by administrative tribunals. 
Clearly the metaphor of the spectrum fails to capture important information about 
administrative independence from political interference. 
Moreover, the idea of a set of administrative functions that may glide along a spectrum 
militates against any suggestion that some decision-makers should be given special 
protection. Ellis has convincingly argued, for instance, that administrative tribunals 
exercising judicial functions should be protected by the same doctrines of independence 
that courts of law benefit from: norms that guarantee security of tenure, security of 
remuneration and institutional autonomy.127 Indeed, in the province of Quebec, where 
administrative independence has a quasi-constitutional status, courts have been able to 
ensure these protections for administrative tribunals. It might be the case that the 
metaphor of the spectrum has such a hold on the judicial imagination that it has become 
impossible to conceive of an administrative tribunal with a dedicated, single function that 
is so important as to warrant heightened protection. A metaphor that evokes movement 
may shield from the judicial eye the need for special protection at certain fixed points on 
the spectrum.128  
                                                          
124 Adrian Vermeule, “Conventions of Agency Independence” (2013), 113 Columbia Law Review 1163 
125 Bank of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c B-2, s. 14. 
126 See e.g. Andrew Coyne, “Bank of Canada, a.k.a the Harper government, needs to be honest about its 
monetary policy”, National Post, January 22, 2014. 
127 Ron Ellis, Unjust by Design: Canada’s Administrative Justice System (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2013). 
128 This is not to say that administrative tribunals exercising judicial functions should be treated as the 
functional equivalents of courts of law. In the rigorous enforcement of norms of independence, context may 
legitimately be taken into account: the Quebec Court of Appeal has been very clear about the importance of 
following a nuanced approach that is attentive to context. See e.g. Association des juges administratifs de la 
Commission des lésions professionnelles c. Québec (Procureur général), 2013 QCCA 1690, where the 
Court of Appeal refused to require that members of the Commission des lésions professionnelles be treated 
identically to members of the Tribunal administratif du Québec in terms of independence. As Bich J.A. 
explained at para. 27: 
Les garanties conférées en cette matière aux tribunaux administratifs, et qui trouvent leur source 
dans les règles de la justice naturelle, peuvent donc varier et elles varieront en fonction de la nature 
précise du pouvoir décisionnel et des modalités d’exercice de ce pouvoir, le tout sous réserve des 
termes de la loi. Dans cet ordre fluctuant, le tribunal administratif qui exerce des fonctions 
purement juridictionnelles – et la Cour suprême, là encore, l’a confirmé – doit offrir le niveau de 
garantie le plus élevé, niveau qui n’a cependant pas, je me permets de le répéter, à être celui des 
cours supérieures ni même celui des autres cours de justice. 
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V. The Problematic Personification of the Reasonable Observer 
As is well known, “it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance 
that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be 
done”.129 All public bodies are subject to this rule against bias, though it is applied 
flexibly to administrative decision-makers.130 In administrative law, the question is 
always “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and 
practically—and having thought the matter through—conclude. Would he think that it is 
more likely than not that [the decision-maker] whether consciously or unconsciously, 
would not decide fairly?”131  
Unfortunately, the suggestion that the so-called ‘reasonable observer’ might actually be a 
real person is a source of intractable difficulty in this area.132  This ‘reasonable observer’ 
is purely a judicial construct; indeed, in attributing various degrees of knowledge to the 
hypothetical observer, a judge may simply be “holding up a mirror to himself”.133 
Although it is more accurate to say that “the court in cases such as these personifies the 
reasonable man”134, any reference to a hypothetical reasonable person “encourages the 
conflation of ‘descriptive’ attributes of the person with the normative standard of 
behaviour”.135 This is an invitation to woolly thinking: decisions justified on the basis 
that ‘a reasonable person would think X’ with little or no discussion of why the judge 
believes intervention would be appropriate or inappropriate.  
A court faced with an allegation of biased decision-maker should not ask: “Would the 
hypothetical reasonable person think the decision-maker was not impartial?” Rather, the 
question should be: “Should the decision-maker recuse herself?” Or, as the High Court of 
Australia would have it, “There must be an articulation of the logical connection between 
the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits”.136 
Abandoning the pretense that hypothetical reasonable persons have any role to play in 
administrative law adjudication is a necessary pre-condition to a meaningful inquiry that 
                                                          
129 R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, at p. 259, per Lord Hewart C.J. 
130 See e.g. Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, [1949] 1 All E.R. 109, at p. 118, per Tucker L.J.:  
There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and 
every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the 
circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the 
subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth 
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will enable jurists to determine when reviewing courts should intervene on the grounds of 
partiality.137 
When it comes to questions of bias, unfortunately, clear rules are elusive. There are no 
equivalent to the procedural fairness rules that are obscured by the metaphor of the 
spectrum – perhaps for this reason the hypothetical reasonable observer continues to 
persist. The inquiry is always “highly fact-specific”: “There are no shortcuts”.138 A 
significant pecuniary interest,139 prejudicial comments before or during a decision-
making process,140 a prior relationship with one of the parties,141 pre-judgement of the 
issues,142 or overly vigorous prosecution143 can make a decision-maker’s position 
untenable. But the relevant question is not what a man or woman plucked off the street at 
random would say about the impartiality of the decision-maker: what matters is the 
judge’s considered view of the decision-maker’s ability to conduct a fair hearing. As 
Gageler J. recently put it, in an Australian case in which a prosecutor had also 
participated in the adjudication of the proceedings she had earlier been involved in, “a 
person who has been the adversary of another person in the same or related proceedings 
can ordinarily be expected to have developed in that role a frame of mind which is 
incompatible with the exercise of that degree of neutrality required dispassionately to 
weigh legal, factual and policy considerations relevant to the making of a decision which 
has the potential adversely to affect interests of that other person”.144 This conclusion 
adequately captures the normative content of the requirement of administrative 
impartiality. 
One area of the rule against bias in which courts have achieved an important degree of 
clarity is that relating to decisions taken by elected officials. When a representative of a 
segment of the population is not exercising an adjudicative function,145 she may speak 
freely of her intuitions about future decisions as long as she does not demonstrate a 
‘closed mind’.146 Here at least the rule is clear. Of course it is not self-applying and 
cannot be enforced without a modicum of subjective judicial judgement, but the 
achievement of clarity suggests that once the defective tool of personification is cast 
aside, sustained reflection on the normative underpinnings of the rule against bias may 
yield rewarding outcomes. 
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VI. Conclusion 
My argument has been that the use of descriptive language – in many different guises – 
obscures the fundamentally normative task of judicial review of administrative action. 
The ills described here are not at all unique to administrative law,147 but they have caused 
significant malaise in the subject. High-level descriptions of the subject may occasionally 
be useful in furthering understanding or facilitating dialogue across national boundaries. 
But care is required. Descriptive language is often either useless – because it adds 
nothing but a conclusory label to a conclusion reached on other grounds – or downright 
dangerous – because it hides the norms guiding judges – or both. It should be discarded 
where possible. Administrative lawyers have to think and judges to justify themselves in 
normative terms. Mission statements, labels, terminological exactitude, metaphors and 
personification are descriptive devices better left to publishing houses.  
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